THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

The Deputy Director for Intelligence is charged with the evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of finished intelligence at the national level.

The DDI takes over from the intelligence collectors, weighs and processes the information they have obtained, checks it out against all other available information, and then sees to it that as much of the finished product as bears on our national security gets to the appropriate customers--the policy-making officers of our Government.

Our main job is to provide to the Director of Central Intelligence--and through him to the President and the top policy-making officers of the Government--an accurate, up-to-date, and thoroughly objective analysis of foreign developments and situations relating to US national security, drawing on all sources of information available to any part of the US Government.

The finished product of the Directorate of Intelligence takes a wide variety of forms. It may be a regular publication, a detailed research study, a spot memorandum,

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or even an oral briefing, according to the circumstances and the intended end use. It may be a specialized piece of military, or economic, or scientific intelligence. It could be the unilateral product of one office, or the considered and agreed judgment of the entire intelligence community. It might be a broadside addressed to the whole national security segment of the executive branch, or it may be specifically and personally tailored to the requirements and preferences of the President himself.

In other words, the scope of the intelligence which we produce is determined by the situation throughout the world and by the range of our national security interests. The form in which it is processed is determined by the requirements of the consumers.

Let me stress my reference a minute ago to the personal requirements and preferences of the President. The individuals occupying the Presidency change, Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency change, and with them the emphasis, the procedures, and even the functions of intelligence change too.

Under the Truman and Eisenhower regimes, policy papers moved methodically upward through the departments and working groups to planning boards and formal NSC

presentation. In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the White House has generally preferred to deal with a crisis by calling together the top policy makers, putting all the available information on the table, and then taking up the possible courses of US policy and action.

These changes have put a premium on crash reporting, and in effect have made the Office of Current Intelligence, under the DDI, a principal agent for the Director in keeping the White House informed.

Under the present requirements, there are four key words that apply to the finished intelligence:

It is national intelligence.

It is all-source intelligence.

It is tactical intelligence.

It is "net" intelligence.

National intelligence is formally defined as coordinated, agreed intelligence on matters with a direct bearing on national security interests which "transcend the exclusive competence" of any one Government department or agency.

The Agency produces three types of national intelligence documents. The first, National Intelligence Estimates, primarily deal with assessments of the outlook and future

trends of various foreign governments of particular interest to US policy. All resources of the DDI are available to support the preparation of NIEs. The second, National Intelligence Surveys, are descriptions and data on the historical background and more permanent characteristics of foreign countries. They form an encyclopedic compendium of information on each country, which includes economic, geographic, and military basic information. The NISs are produced by the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence from contributions from elements of CIA and other departments of Government. The third, National Current Intelligence, is primarily the Central Intelligence Bulletin which is published daily. Now, there is also a definition for current intelligence--"spot information of immediate interest and value"--but there is no definition for the combined concept of national current intelligence, probably because our interpretation of the word "current" in many cases leaves little time for any formal type of coordination.

Nevertheless, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended in 1957 that the Central Intelligence Bulletin should be the principal all-source current intelligence publication of the intelligence community.

Accordingly, and because of the special responsibilities for alerting the policy makers, OCI has developed a procedure for coordinating and producing agreed evaluations on a day-to-day basis. These draft items for the CIB are circulated to the community each day by secure communications channels. They are reviewed by the competent desk officers at each department or agency. Each afternoon a CIB panel meets in OCI to coordinate. The panel includes representatives from the DDP, the Department of State, the Pentagon and, when appropriate, the AEC and FBI. These representatives bring with them such changes, additions, or deletions as their working desks may have suggested, and we try to reach an agreed version largely by matching the drafts with the source and background material. I want to emphasize that the purpose of these changes is to make the language more precise, rather than by watering down or waffling the wording. At any rate, about six o'clock each evening the draft of the CIB constitutes agreed national current intelligence.

Before it reaches its readers at the opening of business the next morning, however, changes frequently have to be made to update it, and these changes are clearly marked as the product of unilateral OCI action.

The second key word is all-source. Production of finished intelligence is based on all sources of information available to the US Government regardless of the classification of the finished product. In publications at the SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL level, it is not necessary or even possible to discuss all the sensitive sources of intelligence, but the principle is that at a minimum such publications will not include information at a low level of classification which is known to be inconsistent with information from more sensitive sources. I know of only one publication which actually discusses all sensitive information as appropriate--the President's Daily Brief. The principle is that nothing is so sensitive that the President and a very few top advisors should not know about. This publication is disseminated in less than a dozen copies--to the President and a few other top-level officials, like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

My third key word was tactical intelligence, for it has become a fact of life that the very highest policy makers are now deeply concerned with the tactical details of any crisis situation as it develops.

Starting with the Dominican crisis we have become accustomed to printing situation reports as often as every

hour on the hour, around the clock, on any major international situation. Typically, when critical situations "go tactical," an analytical task force is established in the CIA Operations Center to receive, evaluate, and disseminate information from every available source and to respond to White House and NSC-level requirements.

The Situation Room in the White House is manned by seven OCI officers, under the direction of the Operations Center. The Center is linked to the White House Situation Room by just about every secure means of communication devised by man--the latest addition is Long Distance Xerography with on-line scrambler--and when all of these break down, the Watch Officers in OCI and the White House have worked side by side long enough to double-talk on regular telephones in emergencies. The result is that the White House Situation Room, minute-by-minute, can reflect the same situation information on a crisis which we display in the Operations Center.

The fourth and final key word was "net" intelligence. It was our practice in the past not to reflect the policies, actions, and reactions of the US Government in finished

intelligence reporting; this is still true for the National Intelligence Estimates. Methods and requirements change with administrations, however, and we have found, from the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 to the present situation in Vietnam, that our top customers today regularly expect a full picture of the crisis in one paper--not just what the Communists are doing, but what we are doing to counter them. For example, our daily Vietnam report includes a rundown on US-allied action in Vietnam as well as enemy activities.